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SECURING AMERICA’S CAPITAL 
By Patricia E. Gallagher ∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
Faced with the challenge of nearly constant threat alerts and reactive 
solutions in the form of concrete barriers and cordoned-off streets, federal 
planners in Washington, D.C. are pioneering the field of security design.  
The nation’s capital seems an appropriate location for this work given its 
status as home to national and international leaders, nearly 400,000 federal 
workers, twenty million annual visitors, treasured architectural icons, and 
irreplaceable artifacts of American history.1
The National Capital Planning Commission (“NCPC” or “the 
Commission”), the federal planning agency for the nation’s capital, stepped 
forward in March 2001 to formally address the blight of security clutter.  
NCPC formed an Interagency Security Task Force comprised of federal 
and local government representatives to develop recommendations for 
managing security needs.
  Federal agencies are desperate 
to prevent the catastrophic damage that may potentially be inflicted by a 
vehicle attack and are taking preemptive action by installing barriers that 
they can quickly obtain and install.  While these measures sometimes fulfill 
immediate demands for protection, they mar the city’s design, obstruct 
access to public space, and heighten the atmosphere of terror. 
2
 
∗ Patricia E. Gallagher is a Harvard University Loeb Fellow with twenty years of experience 
in urban planning, development, and communications.  As Executive Director of the 
National Capital Planning Commission (“NCPC”), she provides the twelve-member 
commission with planning expertise and policy recommendations and oversees a staff of 
nearly sixty professionals.  During her tenure, NCPC released its groundbreaking National 
Capital Urban Design and Security Plan.  Ms. Gallagher previously worked for the City of 
Chicago, where she served first as Assistant Commissioner for Open Space Planning and 
later as Deputy Commissioner of Strategic Planning. 
  A few months after beginning this work, the 
devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 (“September 11” or “9/11”) 
occurred, adding new urgency to NCPC’s task. Just one month after 9/11, 
 1. NAT’L CAPITAL PLANNING COMM’N, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL 
CAPITAL: FEDERAL ELEMENTS 5 (2004). 
 2. See Spencer S. Hsu, Task Force Proposed on Capital Security; Officials Respond to 
Street Closings, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2004, at B01. 
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the Commission released its report, Designing for Security in the Nation’s 
Capital.3
One year later, in October 2002, the Commission released its National 
Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, which received two major 
national planning awards.
  This document set the stage for a more comprehensive urban 
design plan prepared by the Commission, a plan that many in the security 
arena have considered groundbreaking. 
4
I.  SECURITY RESPONSES PRIOR TO 9/11 
  It is one of the first plans to provide guidance 
on integrating perimeter security into landscapes and streetscapes. 
While the events of 9/11 prompted a surge in the use of temporary 
security measures throughout the nation’s capital, this development 
actually emerged several years earlier, following the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing. At that time, the Secret Service closed Pennsylvania Avenue in 
front of the White House to vehicular traffic and installed guardhouses, 
delta barriers, concrete planters, and other temporary devices.  Closing the 
Avenue provided a safe and convenient pedestrian zone, but it deprived 
thirteen bus lines and up to 30,000 vehicles daily of a major east-west 
traffic artery.5
In 1998, the National Park Service, in response to both national and 
international terrorist threats, installed temporary security measures at the 
base of the Washington Monument.
  The closure detracted from the appearance of the White 
House grounds and destroyed the symbolism of placing the President’s 
home on an open street with a direct connection to the U.S. Capitol. 
6  These measures included a double 
row of concrete jersey barriers placed in a ring around the monument plaza, 
and an interim security structure attached to the east face of the 
monument.7
 
 3. NCPC, DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter 
DESIGNING FOR SECURITY]. 
  The barriers were installed as a vehicular barrier system while 
the interim security structure was installed as a place to screen visitors 
 4. NCPC, NAT’L CAPITAL URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN (Oct. 2002, Nov. 2004 
Addendum) [hereinafter NAT’L CAPITAL].  The plan won two national awards, the American 
Planning Association’s 2005 Current Topic Award for Safe Growth and the American 
Planning Association’s 2002 Federal Division Award for Outstanding Federal Planning 
Project.  See Press Release Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, NCPC Plans Win Nat’l Awards 
(Mar. 22, 2005), available at 
http://www.ncpc.gov/publications_press/Press_Releases/2004/pr122204.html; Press Release 
Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, Commission’s Security and Design Plan Receives Top 
National Award (Apr. 4, 2003), available at 
http://ncpc.gov/publications_press/Press_Releases/2003/pr040403.html.   
 5. See DESIGNING FOR SECURITY, supra note 3, at 17. 
 6. Id. at 15. 
 7. Id. 
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ascending the monument.  These additions to the otherwise elegant 
monument obstructed important vistas and hindered pedestrian circulation. 
Pennsylvania Avenue and the Washington Monument represent two of 
the most significant examples of poor security design prior to 9/11, but they 
were not alone.  Temporary perimeter security had been installed at several 
facilities in the nation’s capital, including the Office of Personnel 
Management and the Holocaust Memorial Museum.8
II.  COMPREHENSIVE URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLANNING 
 
The use of ad-hoc security burgeoned after 9/11, bringing even greater 
relevance to NCPC’s security design work.  In developing the National 
Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, NCPC collaborated with more 
than seventy-five departments and organizations representing federal and 
local government, civic and business groups, the professional design 
community, and the public.9
The National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan addresses 
security features designed for threats posed by bomb-laden vehicles—not 
threats posed by pedestrian-borne bombs, letter bombs, or chemical or 
biological weapons.  Using a variety of solutions, the plan shows how to 
integrate building perimeter security into the environment.
  NCPC presented its design work to dozens of 
audiences in Washington and around the country and carefully considered 
public comments in preparing the final document. 
10  When 
security plans are well-conceived and properly executed, the plan suggests, 
they can create safe and aesthetically pleasing public spaces that preserve 
Washington’s historic urban design.11
The plan is based on a framework that highlights important precincts, 
streets, and memorials within Washington’s monumental core.  The plan 
addresses the open public spaces of the National Mall, the national 
monuments and memorials, Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House, the 
public sidewalks and building yards of several of the city’s prominent 
federal precincts, and downtown Washington.
 
12
 
 8. NCPC, Office of Personnel Mgmt. Case (1999) (staff report file # 5982).  On 
October 7, 1999 and December 2, 1999, NCPC reviewed plans for a security barrier system 
at the Office of Personnel Management that would replace unsightly barriers and provide 
more comprehensive protection.  Id.  On February 3, 2000, NCPC reviewed plans for 
security bollards at the Holocaust Memorial Museum that would replace jersey barriers and 
bollards with impact-resistant and visually compatible bollards.  See NCPC, Holocaust 
Memorial Museum Case (2000) (staff report file # 2016).   
  The plan does not 
 9. See NAT’L CAPITAL, supra note 4, at iv, 89. 
 10. See generally NAT’L CAPITAL, supra note 4. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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advocate installing security measures in every situation, nor does it 
recommend a one-size-fits-all approach.  NCPC urges federal agencies to 
conduct reasonable assessments of their facilities to determine whether or 
not security enhancements are necessary.13
For facilities that do require some level of security, the National Capital 
Urban Design and Security Plan proposes solutions that are tailored to 
particular precincts and ones that will enhance the pedestrian 
environment.
  The agency’s function, number 
of employees and visitors, and building design are some of the factors that 
affect a facility’s threat level.  An agency may naturally tend to elevate its 
threat level and, consequently, end up with a facility that is over-designed 
for security. 
14  The plan illustrates streetscape design solutions for four 
street types based on roadway widths, sidewalks, and building setbacks.15  
The street types include monumental avenues, diagonal avenues, special 
streets, and grid streets.16  The design for monumental avenues, which 
connect and define the most important areas of the city, should reflect 
formality and emphasize the streetscape as a whole.17  Diagonal avenues, 
which are typically wide and have significant landscaping, should highlight 
landscape features.18  Because special streets form important connections 
or are part of special planning areas, they should be handled in a way that 
reinforces their individual conditions and character.19  Designs for grid 
streets—the consistent north-south and east-west streets—should be 
specific to each area, providing continuity with previous design efforts.20
NCPC’s plan proposes a family of streetscape elements, including street 
furniture, landscaped planting walls, security bollards embedded within 
rows of hedges, and sidewalk planters.
 
21
Since the plan was adopted, federal agencies that previously took an 
uncoordinated and incremental approach to installing perimeter security are 
now coordinating their security projects.  So far, the plan has been used to 
  By using elements that 
pedestrians would expect to find along a sidewalk, designers can create 
secured streetscapes that are far less intrusive and far more hospitable and 
attractive. 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 6. 
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guide more than sixty security submissions by various federal agencies.  
One of the most prominent projects undertaken as a result of the plan is the 
redesign of Pennsylvania Avenue in the front of the White House.22  This 
symbolically significant destination is now a dignified civic space featuring 
new pedestrian-friendly amenities and site furnishings.  Twin-headed 
streetlights, originally designed for Washington by Henry Bacon in 1923, 
now line the precinct.23  Rustic pavement helps to unify the White House 
grounds with Lafayette Park, and large granite pavers reinforce the 
avenue’s connection to the city’s urban fabric.  In place of bulky planter 
pots, specially designed bollards ensure a visually open setting and allow 
for authorized vehicular access.24  New guard booths complement the 
classical architecture found along the avenue, and eighty-eight new 
Princeton American elm trees will provide a welcoming canopy for 
pedestrians.25
The loss of vehicular traffic through the avenue cannot be fully 
compensated, but NCPC ensured that the new design for Pennsylvania 
Avenue would accommodate the Circulator, a hop-on, hop-off shuttle 
service that will provide riders with a convenient way to visit the city’s 
major attractions, including the White House.
 
26  The redesigned avenue 
officially opened to pedestrians on November 9, 2004 in a ceremony with 
First Lady Laura Bush and the federal and local partners who collaborated 
on the effort.27
Several other security projects have been initiated since adoption of the 
National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan.  The iconic Washington 
Monument, as previously described, served as a great example of poor 
security design and had become an eyesore along the most prominent 
walkway in the nation’s capital.  An initial proposal for a permanent 
solution called for a circle of 370 bollards, installed 185 feet from the 
monument’s base.
 
28
 
 22. NCPC, Federal Highway Admin. Case (2003) (staff file #6132).  This project was 
submitted by the Federal Highway Administration, and the NCPC approved final site and 
building plans on September 4, 2003.  See id. 
  The Commission rejected this concept, citing the 
incongruity of placing steel bollards in the gently rolling topography of the 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See First Lady Welcomes Pedestrians to Pennsylvania Avenue, NCPC QUARTERLY, 
Oct.-Dec. 2004, at 1. 
 28. NCPC, National Park Serv. Case (2001) (staff file #1303/6152).  The National Park 
Service submitted this project, and the NCPC disapproved the proposed concept plan on 
July 3, 2001.  See id. 
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greensward.29  Instead, NCPC approved an appropriate landscape design 
that complements the Mall setting.30  The new scheme, now under 
construction, consists of a protective retaining wall, new pedestrian 
pathways, upgraded lighting, and hundreds of new trees.31
Security plans for the Lincoln Memorial also demonstrate the continuing 
challenge of finding the right balance between appropriate security 
measures and site-sensitive design. Preliminary plans for the memorial 
feature a low wall to enclose the circular lawn on which the Lincoln 
Memorial sits.
  Once 
improvements are completed, the public will once again enjoy unobstructed 
and attractive views of the world-famous obelisk. 
32  Other changes include traffic and pedestrian 
improvements, new street lights, and new concession buildings.33  One 
element of the proposal that the Commission did not endorse depicted a 
long line of bollards above the stairs to the Reflecting Pool.34
Improvements to security and design at memorials and monuments are 
not the only projects underway.  Guided by the National Capital Urban 
Design and Security Plan, the world-renowned Smithsonian Institution 
designed a new perimeter security solution for several of its buildings on 
the National Mall.
  NCPC 
requested a revision to this element after concluding that the proposed 
concept would form an intrusive barrier between the Memorial and the 
Reflecting Pool.  A more thoughtfully designed scheme should be 
seamless, offering protection without hindering physical, symbolic, and 
historic connections. 
35  Custom-designed elements that correspond to 
differences in architecture, streetscape elements, and roadway conditions 
will replace temporary components, such as chain-link fencing and 
ungainly planters, which detract from the appearance and prestige of the 
National Mall.36
 
 29. Id. 
  Tree panels, hardened benches, light poles, and retaining 
walls are a sampling of the elements that will be used in the redesign of the 
 30. See id.  The National Park Service submitted this project, and the NCPC approved 
final site development plans on June 5, 2003.  Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NCPC, National Park Serv. Case (2005) (staff file #6265).  The National Park 
Service submitted various aspects of this proposal for NCPC’s review on July 11, 2002, 
December 4, 2003, February 5, 2004, January 6, 2005, and April 7, 2005.  See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  The National Park Service submitted this project, and NCPC approved plans on 
February 4, 2004.  Id. 
 35. NCPC, Smithsonian Inst. Case (2004) (staff file #6423).  The Smithsonian 
Institution submitted this project, and NCPC approved preliminary plans on October 7, 
2004.  See id. 
 36. Id. 
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Smithsonian.37  The National Museum of the American Indian, a new 
Smithsonian building on the Mall, prepared its own security scheme to 
reflect elements of the new structure’s design.38  Boulders, planter walls, 
and granite and bronze bollards comprise the security palette for this 
project.39
NCPC urges all federal agencies to refer to the National Capital Urban 
Design and Security Plan in designing their projects and works closely 
with agencies that face heightened risks.
 
40  The Federal Reserve, the central 
bank of the United States, tailored a perimeter security plan to meet its 
special needs, which include twenty-four hour surveillance.41  The proposal 
incorporates kiosks to house security guards and consists of landscape 
features, including plinth walls and planters, bollards, and a fence wall.42
Constructing and installing permanent security barriers may take 
considerable time.  As federal agencies pursue well-designed solutions, 
NCPC urges minimal use of ad-hoc measures and directs federal agencies 
to submit plans for any security projects that will be installed for more than 
sixty days.
 
43  “Temporary” security barriers have a way of becoming long-
term solutions, as observed in the case of the Washington Monument and 
Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House.  To prevent these types of future 
occurrences, NCPC ruled that no temporary security project should be in 
place for more than two years.44
III.  APPLYING NCPC’S SECURITY PLAN OUTSIDE THE NATION’S 
CAPITAL 
 
While heightened alert levels in the United States may be felt 
particularly in Washington, D.C. and New York, other cities across the 
country have installed security barriers around their public facilities, 
symbolic monuments, and popular tourist attractions.45
 
 37. Id. 
  Although NCPC’s 
 38. NCPC, Smithsonian Inst. Case (2003) (staff file #5087).  The Smithsonian 
Institution submitted this project, and NCPC approved final site development plans on 
August 7, 2003.  See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. NCPC, Policy on Design and Review of Physical Perimeter Security Improvements 
(2003) (staff file #6318) [hereinafter Policy on Design]. 
 41. NCPC, Fed. Reserve Case (2003) (staff file #6401).  The Board of Governors for the 
Federal Reserve submitted this project, and NCPC approved preliminary site development 
plans on December 4, 2003.  See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Policy on Design, supra note 40. 
 44. See id. 
 45. After 9/11, ad-hoc security barriers were installed at several prominent locations 
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National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan focuses on federal 
facilities in the nation’s capital, its principles and concepts can be applied 
well beyond Washington, D.C.  When perimeter security is deemed 
necessary, NCPC encourages planners in other cities to consider using 
security elements proposed in the National Capital Urban Design and 
Security Plan.46 Design concepts developed for Washington’s downtown 
are particularly relevant to typical urban areas that consist of blocks with a 
mix of old and new and a variation of styles, scales, and materials.  For 
standard grid streets, the plan recommends the use of hardened streetscape 
components that are common to any city block, including streetlights, 
benches, trash cans, and newspaper vending machines.47
Since the plan was adopted, NCPC has been asked to give presentations 
in cities across the country and around the world.  Planners from Ottawa, 
Canada and Canberra, Australia have turned to the plan as they begin the 
process of developing their own security solutions. 
 
IV. KEEPING UP WITH EVOLVING SECURITY NEEDS 
The Commission has noted the evolution of federal security 
requirements since the National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan’s 
release.  The plan provided solutions for protecting against the threat of 
bomb-laden vehicles, but federal agencies are now seeking protection 
against additional threats, including chemical and suicide attacks.  To 
defend against such threats, agency security managers are considering an 
expanded array of security measures not envisioned in the urban design and 
security plan.  The Commission contemplates how these escalating threat 
assessments and potentially extreme security responses may undermine its 
objectives for a vibrant capital city that showcases democratic ideals of 
openness and accessibility.  In addition, the cost of ever more sophisticated 
security measures against an expanding array of threats could overwhelm 
individual agency budgets. 
To address these shifts, the Commission reconvened its Interagency 
Security Task Force to better understand the evolving threat environment, 
manage the risk assessment process, and develop reasonable, cost-effective 
security responses.48
 
throughout the country, including Chicago’s Sears Tower and Federal Plaza, Seattle’s Space 
Needle, and San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge. 
  As the Commission advances its security design 
 46. See NAT’L CAPITAL, supra note 4. 
 47. See id. at 7. 
 48. See Hsu, supra note 2.  The task force is comprised of several members and 
representatives of the National Capital Planning Commission as well as representatives from 
the Department of Homeland Security.  See id. 
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work, it will continue to work with its partners and stakeholders to find an 
acceptable balance between meeting legitimate security needs and creating 
lively, welcoming, and economically vibrant communities. 
CONCLUSION 
The concrete barriers, sewer pipes, and chain-link fencing that prompted 
the National Capital Planning Commission’s security efforts 
inconvenienced city residents, workers, and visitors and degraded the 
appearance of one of the most carefully designed and naturally beautiful 
cities in the world.  And yet, what made these barriers intolerable was their 
underlying message—that the nation’s capital would allow terrorists to 
limit the American hallmark of open access. The National Capital Planning 
Commission does not ask federal agencies to ignore the threat reality, but it 
does ask that agencies cease to install monuments of fear and retrenchment.  
As the capital’s watchful steward, the Commission is committed to 
preserving urban design ideals and cultivating Washington’s two-hundred-
year-old planning tradition. 
 
